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The Arbitration of Federal Domestic Antitrust
Claims: How Safe is the American
Safety Doctrine?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.'
that predispute agreements to arbitrate all claims arising from an
agreement or contract were unenforceable as to federal antitrust
claims. This ruling, known as the American Safety doctrine, has
been accepted as law on the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims.
Recent cases, however, have limited the reach of the American
Safety doctrine and have called into question its viability. In 1985,
the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc.2 held that the American Safety doctrine no longer ap-
plied to federal antitrust claims that arose from international trans-
actions. The Court agreed, however, that the American Safety rule
still applied to domestic antitrust claims. Most recently, the Supreme
Court held in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon3 that
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act)4 and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) 5 were arbitrable.6 While not addressing whether the
American Safety doctrine continues to apply to domestic antitrust
claims, the McMahon holding, by analogy, may have sounded its
death knell.
This comment begins with a brief overview of commercial arbitra-
tion in the United States. Part III examines the Supreme Court's
cases on commercial arbitration, specifically with regard to claims
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act),7 the 1934
Act,$ and international antitrust claims arising under the Sherman
1. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
3. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2343, 2345-46.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771-777bbbb (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
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Act9 and Clayton Act,10 and RICO" claims. This section argues that,
based on the Supreme Court's analysis of the arbitrability of these
federal statutory claims, domestic antitrust claims, previously consid-
ered nonarbitrable under American Safety, should be arbitrable. Not
only has the Court narrowed the doctrine in Mitsubishi so that only
domestic claims are nonarbitrable, it has also held that claims under
the RICO Act, which was explicitly patterned after the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts, are arbitrable under McMahon. These deci-
sions, along with Congress' choice to allow arbitration of patent law
claims,12 signal to the court that it should similarly find domestic an-
titrust claims arbitrable. Finally, Part IV examines McMahon and
the analogy between antitrust law and RICO and discusses the con-
flicting rationales underlying the arbitrability of domestic antitrust
claims, concluding that because arbitration can adequately protect
the public's interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, such
claims should be arbitrable.
II. ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. An Overview of Commercial Arbitration
Today, the judicial system faces a litigation "crisis" as dockets have
become increasingly crowded and the court system overburdened and
overworked. Commentators have argued that time and money spent
on the judicial resolution of disputes is largely wasted and only
slightly benefits our economy.13 The growing dissatisfaction with the
cumbersome and inefficient judicial system has increased interest in
the many alternatives to litigation available to parties seeking to re-
solve a dispute. Among the alternatives advocated by those in the
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement are mediation,
9. Id. §§ 1-7.
10. Id. §§ 12-27.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (voluntary arbitration al-
lowed for patent claims).
13. See R. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); Bok, A
"Flawed" Profession, N.Y.ST. B. J., Nov. 1983, at 31, 32; Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982); Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical
Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 71
(1981) (federal case filings rose from 36,734 in 1940 to 168,789 in 1980); Miller, The Ad-
versary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984). Some commenta-
tors, however, view the empirical data differently and believe that no litigation crisis
exists. These experts point out that throughout modern history, complaints of increas-
ing litigation were commonplace, even as far back as the 1800s. See, e.g., Alschuler,
Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a
Two-tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817-20 (1986); Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4
(1983). The perception of an explosion, rightly or wrongly held, has enhanced the
growth of arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution.
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mini-trials, and summary jury trials.'4 This comment will focus
solely on one form of alternative dispute resolution-commerical
arbitration.
Commercial arbitration of a dispute commonly results when two or
more contracting parties include in the contract a provision requiring
all disputes and claims to be resolved through arbitration rather than
through the court system.15 For numerous reasons, commercial arbi-
tration has become increasingly popular during the past two decades.
.With the dramatic rise in litigation costs, businesses have turned to
arbitration of commercial disputes because it is generally a quicker,
more efficient, and less costly alternative to litigation. The efficiency
of arbitration is readily apparent. Arbitration is characterized by an
"absence of.. . 'dead time' between hearings and other active phases
of the process."'16 Since "the parties buy and schedule the arbitrator's
time directly, there is rarely the kind of costly waiting" common to
adjudication.17 Moreover, "arbitration provides a higher ratio of ac-
tual adjudications per unit of resource expenditure."18
Because arbitral awards are generally unreviewable by courts, par-
ties reach a quicker and cheaper final resolution and avoid the costs
incurred in appellate litigation. An award by an arbitrator is final
and binds the parties. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the award
must be confirmed by a court unless the party challenging the award
can show: (1) it was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) the arbitrator failed to render a final decision; or (3) the arbitra-
tor demonstrated a "manifest disregard for the law."19 Because an
14. See L. KANOWITz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION (1986); JOHNSON, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES
IN CIVIL CASES (1977).
15. The arbitration provision is commonly a boilerplate clause inserted into the
contract by one party often with little resistance from the other. A standard clause
may provide that "the parties agree to submit all disputes arising from the perform-
ance or breach of this contract to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association. Any award rendered shall be final and binding upon the
parties." The parties may, of course, restrict the scope of the provision by appropriate
language. When the restrictive language is not clear, however, courts will resolve all
doubts in favor of arbitration. See McClendon, Subject Matter Arbitrability in Interna-
tional Cases: Mitsubishi Motors Closes the Circle, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 81,
92 (1987).
16. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdic-
tional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WiSc. L. REV. 893, 987.
17. Id. at 987.
18. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for En-
hanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV. 219 (1985).
19. Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
S203
arbitrator need not provide the reasoning behind an award, arbitral
decisions essentially are unreviewable. Judicial review of arbitral
awards would negate the chief benefits of arbitration, namely speed
and efficiency. 20
Parties often will agree to arbitrate future disputes in an effort to
preserve their business relationship and avoid the antagonism of for-
mal adjudication. Arbitration, with its relaxed rules of evidence and
procedure, is conducted in a private and informal atmosphere which
tends to promote good will between the parties. The parties may be
more willing to arbitrate a claim than litigate, knowing that the con-
flict most likely will not result in a deterioration of their business re-
lationship. Furthermore, arbitration minimizes the opportunity for
such a deterioration to occur due to its simplified and expeditious
procedures.21
Parties in a particular industry or trade may seek commercial arbi-
tration because it allows them to select the arbitrator familiar with
the practices and customs peculiar to the industry.22 In litigation, the
parties must acquaint the trier of fact-either the judge or jury-
with industry customs and practices and hope that the decision will
be an informed one. This can be a costly and often unsuccessful gam-
ble. Moreover, litigants must realize that juries are often persuaded
by bias and emotion in resolving conflicts. Big business has grown to
fear the "deep-pocket" mentality of the typical civil jury. In seeking
arbitration, the parties can reduce the costs and risks associated with
formal judicial dispute resolution. In addition to being cheaper, arbi-
tration provides both convenience and certainty to the commercial
disputant.
Arbitration, generally private in nature, usually provides greater
confidentiality than litigation, making it far less likely that trade
secrets will be compromised. Additionally, arbitration generally in-
volves limited discovery, and thus provides a plaintiff with less incen-
tive to bring a suit to discover corporate secrets or other information.
While arbitration may be more efficient and expeditious, only re-
cently has it been embraced by the legal and business community as
a viable alternative to judicial dispute resolution. This lack of accept-
REV. 1, 28 & n. 135 (1987) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d) (1982)); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 39-45.
20. See Brunet, supra note 19, at 53-54.
21. See MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neo classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 867 (1978)
(noting that "[p]lanning for the arbitration of rights disputes is an important aspect of
risk planning. But arbitration is also used for filling gaps in performance planning
.... Interest disputes and hence their arbitration are inherently more open-ended
than rights disputes.").
22. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Pub-
lic Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 486, 489 (1981).
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ance may have been due primarily to the fact that arbitration lacks
the numerous safeguards present in the judicial system.
Arbitrators are not bound to follow applicable law, unless com-
manded to do so by the express terms of the arbitration agreement.2 3
Arbitration provisions are commonly boilerplate provisions and usu-
ally do not contain restrictions limiting the power of the arbitrator.
The arbitrator may make any award he deems just, equitable, and
within the scope of the agreement between the parties. Moreover, an
arbitrator is not required to provide the reasons behind the decision
or to explain the decision. As a result, arbitration awards generally
provide a scant record for review.24 Parties to a dispute, therefore,
have reason to fear that a clearly erroneous decision by an arbitrator
will be binding. In contrast, a party involved in formal litigation can
turn to an impartial appellate court to review the judicial record and
overrule a clearly erroneous decision by the trier of fact.25
Just as the absence of a record hinders judicial review, it also fails
to provide guidance for future commercial behavior.26 In contrast, a
judicial resolution can influence future conduct by yielding an opin-
ion written by the judge, which lays out the facts and the law along
with the reasoning behind the court's decision. As will be seen, the
belief that judicial dispute resolution is needed to protect the public's
interest in the proper enforcement of certain federal statutes and to
provide necessary precedent to guide future behavior has led courts
to hold that arbitration is inappropriate for such federal claims.27 Fi-
nally, the benefits of arbitration must be balanced against the loss of
constitutional guarantees of due process, findings of fact, conclusions
of law, federal pleading and discovery rules, and the possible risk of
collateral estoppel or inconsistent verdicts.
23. M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25.01
(1968 & Supp. 1983).
24. Id. § 29.06.
25. One possible check on this risk is the arbitrator's incentive to reach a fair and
equitable decision. Failing to do so, he may quickly find himself out of a job because
the parties may select another arbitrator in future agreements. Some believe that this
leads arbitrators to reach compromises rather than "all-or-nothing" decisions because
they seek to please both of the parties so that they will be used in future arbitrations.
26. One commentator notes that "even assuming that arbitrators do formulate and
utilize given decision rules, these rules are simply not communicated to non-parties...
and therefore cannot readily influence future behavior, thus rendering arbitration in-
capable of significantly reducing activity/disparity/oppression costs." Bush, supra note
16, at 989.
27. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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B. The Development of Arbitration in the United States
Arbitration has a long and storied past. Indeed, arbitration awards
can be found in the Old Testament and Greek mythology.28 In later
times, it thrived in desert caravans in Marco Polo's time. Arbitration
has continued into the modern era as an alternative to more estab-
lished forms of judicial dispute resolution.29
With the exception of the English common law tradition, most
legal systems have viewed arbitration favorably.3 0 The common law's
innate hostility towards arbitration increased over time as arbitration
often was confused with other dispute resolution techniques, such as
mediation or conciliation, which were based on a bargaining pro-
cess.3 ' Arbitration in sixteenth and seventeenth century England fell
into disuse as the absence of contemporary arbitration machinery or
established rules of procedure made it easier for parties to litigate
than to arbitrate.3 2
The colonists brought arbitration with them to America. At first
glance, arbitration would appear to have been ideally suited for a
new nation whose people were bent on freedom, discipline, and self-
regulation; however, arbitration, which embodies these principles,
was largely ignored. 33 Not until the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury did the United States begin to embrace arbitration as a feasible
.28. A few of these early arbitral awards have assumed legendary status today. For
instance, Paris, a .royal shepherd, was called upon to deliver one of the most famous
arbitral decisions. As all other means of settlement had failed between the parties,
Luno, Pallas Athene, and Athena agreed to resolve their competing claims of beauty
through arbitration, with Paris as the arbitrator. In biblical times, Solomon made a
wise arbitral award in the legendary story of two women claiming to be the natural
mother of the same child. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
29. For a general overview of the history of arbitration, see generally F. KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); Sayre,
The Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1925).
30. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 356-60 (1959). There are several theories as to
why arbitration was disfavored by the common law. Some commentators believe that
the early English courts were hostile to nonjudicial forums because they deprived the
English courts of jurisdiction. Id. at 358 & nn.38-39.
31. These techniques were designed to effect compromise rather than justice be-
tween the parties and, as arbitration became indiscriminately applied to all these
processes, the result was a general rejection by the common law of arbitration as a
valid alternative dispute resolution. F. KELLOR, supra note 29, at 5.
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. This development has been traced to America's view toward discord and
dispute:
They [disputes] were complacently accepted phenomenon to be settled by
force or by litigation, if need be. America was such a rich country, full of ad-
venture, and could afford a considerable volume of disputes at a high cost of
settlement. As disputes were regarded as an inevitable and healthful process
in the development of a new country, the prospect that they might become a
menace to society was not an immediate concern ... as the attribute of econ-
omy was not an attraction to arbitration.
Id. at 6.
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alternative to judicial dispute. resolution. "[D]issatisfaction with ju-
ries as the triers of fact in commercial litigation and the long delays
due to congested dockets" in an increasingly litigious society, led dis-
putants to search for alternatives.34 Arbitration, the closest to litiga-
tion of all the alternative dispute resolution techniques, was quickly
adopted by many American businesses to avoid the costs and ineffi-
ciencies of litigation.
A new era for arbitration in America began in 1920, when New
York enacted the first modern arbitration law.35 The law allowed
"enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes" and pro-
vided "very limited judicial review of arbitrators' awards."3 6 Several
states followed New York's lead and adopted similar legislation.3 7 In
1922, the Arbitration Society of America, later the American Arbitra-
tion Association (the Association), became the nation's first perma-
nent institution devoted to developing arbitration as an acceptable
alternative form of dispute resolution.38
The major breakthrough for the acceptance of arbitration in
America, however, did not occur until Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act (the Arbitration Act) in 1925.39 By establishing a
public policy in favor of arbitration, the drafters of the Arbitration
Act sought to overcome the anachronistic judicial hostility (borrowed
by American courts from the English common law courts) toward ar-
34. R. POUND, supra note 30, at 359.
35. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (currently codified in N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989)).
36. Allison, supra note 18, at 226.
37. Id.
38. The Association developed new leadership and outspoken advocates for arbi-
tration as it "brought businessmen, lawyers, economists, teaching and professional men
together in a common endeavor." F. KELLOR, supra note 29, at 61.
39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The Federal Arbitration Act (the Arbitration Act) pro-
vides that written agreements to arbitrate arising out of any maritime transaction or
transaction involving interstate commerce be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such ground as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.§ 2. The Arbitration Act also empowers the federal district courts to determine the
validity of arbitration agreements, to compel arbitration, and to confirm and enforce
arbitral awards. Id. §§ 3, 4, 9 & 10.
In 1970, Congress amended the Arbitration Act to implement the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518 2520,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 30 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter the Convention] (implemented at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)). "The Convention creates a framework to facilitate and en-
courage international arbitration by providing uniform standards for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements and awards." Note, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Aris-
ing from International Commercial Disputes Recognized under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 448, 454-57 (1986).
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bitration agreements. 40 The Arbitration Act was designed to allow
parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation" and to place
arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts."41
Towards this end, it provided for the enforcement of all agreements
to arbitrate except those found to be against public policy42 or to be
the result of a tainted contract.43 By allowing only limited judicial
review of arbitration awards,44 the Arbitration Act promoted the ma-
jor advantages of arbitration over litigation--economy and effi-
ciency-by preventing courts from expending time and resources in a
free wheeling examination of an arbitration award.
Following the creation of the Association and the enactment of the
Arbitration Act, the historical judicial hostility towards arbitration
gave way to a growing acceptance of the process. As courts increas-
ingly became overburdened, and the societal costs of litigation grew
to enormous proportions, courts were compelled to enforce valid ar-
bitration clauses simply to clear their dockets. Judicial acceptance of
arbitration has grown, particularly in the 1980s, and the rules and
procedures of arbitration have become commensurately more sophis-
ticated.45 Courts have struggled, however, in developing a coherent
40. F. KELLOR, supra note 29, at 64.
41. Id.
42. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing... the
court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue in-
volved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (emphasis added).
43. The Arbitration Act's power is grounded in section 2, which states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract .. . involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
a contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing con-
troversy arising out of such a contract . . .shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2.
44. Id. §§ 10-11. A party can request judicial review of an arbitral award when:
the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue influence; there was overt parti-
ality in the arbitrator; the arbitrator exceeded his power or was guilty of misconduct in
unjustly refusing to postpone a hearing or in refusing to hear pertinent evidence; mis-
behavior prejudiced a party. Id.
45. In 1980, Congress passed the Dispute Resolution Act (DRA) to support further
experimentation with varying approaches to ADR. The DRA was designed to provide
seed money for programs and to develop a national resource center for research and
technical assistance in dispute settlement. The DRA was signed into law in February
of 1980, but because of budget cutbacks was never funded; it expired in 1984. In 1986,
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1986, S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a), 132
CONG. REC. 5848 (1986) [hereinafter the ADR Act], was before Congress. See Note, The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1986: A Critical Analysis, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J.
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principle of arbitrability for various federal statutory laws that enact
policies inconsistent with the arbitral process.
III. THE SCOPE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PROVISIONS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SAFETY DOCTRINE
When parties agree to include in a contract an arbitration provi-
sion, a broad boilerplate provision commonly is included to counter-
act the unforeseeable disputes that may arise during the course of
their contractual relationship. These broad provisions created a great
deal of confusion for courts, which struggled to determine the scope
and nature of claims arbitrable under these provisions. Despite the
presumption in favor of arbitrability embodied in the Arbitration
Act, some statutory claims are nonarbitrable because the congres-
sional intent behind them is thought to be incompatible with arbitra-
tion. Accordingly, courts have held that claims arising under several
federal statutes are inappropriate for arbitration and must be re-
solved through litigation.
Unfortunately, courts have been unable to delineate a clear princi-
ple for determining the arbitrability of these statutory claims. They
have adopted various lines of reasoning for determining the arbi-
trability of, among others, claims arising under RICO, the 1933 Act,
and the 1934 Act, as well as the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
Supreme Court has adopted two approaches to determine arbi-
trability: first, it has distinguished between international and domes-
tic transactions and demonstrated a willingness to find claims arising
from international transactions to be arbitrable; and second, it has
examined the "public interest" in the enforcement of the statutory
claims and has held those implicating such an interest to be
nonarbitrable.
In Wilko v. Swan,46 the Supreme Court's first commercial arbitra-
tion case, the Court adopted a "public interest" approach and found
1933 Act claims to be nonarbitrable.47 Applying this analysis in
981, 981 n.1 (1987). The ADR bill would have amended Rule 16.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) by requiring attorneys both to advise the client of the avail-
ability of alternative dispute resolution and to file notice with the court confirming
such advice. The bill would have also amended Rule 68 by allowing the court to im-
pose sanctions upon a party who unreasonably rejects an offer of settlement or an of-
fer to engage in ADR. Id. This proposed addition to the FRCP was not passed by
Congress.
46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
47. Id- at 438.
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American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.,48 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that anti-
trust claims were nonarbitrable.49 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,50
the Court abandoned the public interest approach and adopted an in-
ternational/domestic transaction distinction in finding international
1933 Act claims to be arbitrable.51 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,52 the Court extended the interna-
tional/domestic transaction distinction to antitrust claims in holding
that international antitrust claims were arbitrable. 53 Finally, in the
Court's most recent commercial arbitration case, Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,54 the Court abandoned both approaches
and concluded that 1934 Act and RICO claims were arbitrable. 55
A. The Arbitrability of C7aims Arising Under the
Securities Act of 1933
In 1953, the Supreme Court first addressed the arbitrability of fed-
eral statutory claims arising out of a commercial agreement. In
Wilko v. Swan,56 the plaintiff, a purchaser of securities, sued a bro-
kerage firm in federal court under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,
claiming that the broker misrepresented and omitted material infor-
mation in a stock sale transaction. The margin agreement between
the parties contained a broad boilerplate arbitration provision. The
broker sought an order to stay the litigation and to compel arbitra-
tion under the arbitration provision.57
The Supreme Court held that the arbitration provision was unen-
forceable with regard to the 1933 Act claims.58 The Court main-
48. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 828.
50. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
51. Id. at 519-20.
52. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
53. Id. at 636.
54. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
55. Id. at 2343, 2345-46.
56. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
57. Id. at 429. Recognizing the conflict between the Arbitration Act's preference
for arbitration and the 1933 Act's policy of investor protection, the district court denied
the stay and held that arbitration of 1933 Act claims could not be compelled. 107 F.
Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The court of appeals found the policies of the Arbitration
Act outweighed those of the 1933 Act and reversed the district court's holding.. 201
F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953). The appellate court stated: "[W]e do not find in the purpose of
the language of the statute [the 1933 Act] any policy argument strong enough to over-
ride the policy of the Arbitration Act. If Congress had intended to forbid arbitration
in a suit based on Section 12(2), we believe it would have expressed such intent." Id. at
445.
58. Wilko, 446 U.S. at 438. Specifically, the Court based its holding on section 14
of the 1933 Act which states: "[A]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id. at 430 n.6.
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tained that the public interest in the proper enforcement of the 1933
Act, coupled with that Act's stated intent to protect investors, man-
dated that such claims be resolved in a judicial forum.59 This holding
was clearly grounded in the prevailing judicial perception that the in-
vestor protection policy inherent in the 1933 Act could not be policed
adequately through the arbitration process.60 The Court reasoned
that the weaknesses of arbitration mandated that 1933 Act claims be
nonarbitrable.61 These weaknesses were described as: (1) the need
for "subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
violator of the act";6 2 and (2) the lack of "judicial instruction on the
law" for arbitrators making such determinations. 63 The Court also
noted that the possibility that an arbitrator would grant an award
without an accompanying opinion limited the power of courts to
examine the arbitrator's construction of certain statutory
requirements.64
B. The Arbitrability of Federal Antitrust Claims: The American
Safety Doctrine
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.,65 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a
Wilko-type analysis in considering the enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate all disputes arising from a contract. At issue were claims
and defenses founded on the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.66
The defendant, a clothing manufacturer, had entered into a contract
granting the plaintiff an exclusive license to use the defendant's
Therefore, the parties could not waive the provision that vested exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts of all 1933 Act claims. Id. at 437.
59. Id. at 438.
60. Id. at 435. The Court stated that "[e]ven though the provisions of the Securi-
ties Act, advantageous to the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened
in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings." Id.
61. Id. at 430-31. Furthermore, the Court noted that the power to vacate an arbi-
tration award is limited. Id. at 431 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10).
62. Id. at 435-36.
63. Id. at 436.
64. Id.
65. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
66. Id. at 824. Several earlier cases discussed the arbitrability of federal antitrust
claims. See, e.g., Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink Baking Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159, 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court characterized as persuasive the view that courts should not be
displaced by labor arbitrators in deciding antitrust disputes); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court stating that en-
forceability of arbitration provision as to antitrust claims "would be questionable, be-
cause it would be contrary to public policy implicit in the federal antitrust laws"),
rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
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trademark. The contract granted a sublicense for foreign territo-
ries67 and provided that "[a]ll controversies, disputes and claims of
whatsoever nature and description arising out of, or relating to, this
Agreement and the performance or breach thereof, shall be settled
by arbitration."68
When the relationship between the two parties deteriorated, the
plaintiff sought a judgment declaring the contract void under the
Sherman Act, alleging that an extension of the defendant's trade-
mark monopoly amounted to an unreasonable restriction of the
plaintiff's business. 6 9 The defendant sought a stay pending arbitra-
tion pursuant to the boilerplate arbitration provision contained in the
contract.70 The plaintiff then moved for a preliminary injunction
against the arbitration.71 The district court stayed the declaratory
judgment action and compelled arbitration.72
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on the
Supreme Court's earlier analysis in Wilko v. Swan,73 held that fed-
eral antitrust claims are unsuitable for arbitration and must be re-
solved in a judicial forum.74 Following the reasoning of Wilko, the
67. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 822.
68. Id. at 823. The provision provided in full:
All controversies, disputes and claims of whatsoever nature and description
arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement and the performance or breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in New York State in accordance with
the laws of the State of New York and the rules then obtaining of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association. Any reward rendered in such arbitration shall be
final and binding upon the parties and judgment may be rendered thereon by
any court having jurisdiction.
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. Hickock Mfg. Co., 271 F. Supp. 961, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
69. Id. at 962.
70. Id. at 964. Specifically, the defendant moved under sections 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4, and 6) to stay the instant action and compel
arbitration.
71. 271 F. Supp. at 964.
72. Id. at 967. The court contended:
The arbitration clause in the License Agreement is broad enough to encom-
pass legal issues. Thus, the legal issue which ASE makes the basis of a suit is
an "issue referable to arbitration upon the agreement in writing for such arbi-
tration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. This court, therefore, is required by the Arbitration
Act to stay this action pending arbitration of the projected legal issue. 9
U.S.C. § 3.... There appears to be no public policy bar to permitting parties to
a contract to agree that legal issues arising in connection therewith, including
issues arising under federal law, shall be referred to arbitration.
Id. at 966-67.
73. 346 U.S. 426 (1953).
74. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir.
1968). The court quoted the applicable language in Wilko:
We think that the remedy a statute provides for violation of the statutory
right it creates may be sought not only in "any court of competent jurisdic-
tion" but also in any other competent tribunal, such as arbitration unless the
right itself is of such a character inappropriate for enforcement by
arbitration.
Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953) (emphasis added)).
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American Safety court balanced the policy objectives of the Arbitra-
tion Act against the conflicting concerns of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. While recognizing the Arbitration Act's presumption in favor
of arbitration as both an economical and efficient alternative to litiga-
tion, the court held that antitrust claims were "inappropriate for ar-
bitration" because of the "nature of the claims that arise" and the
public interest involved in the enforcement of such claims.7 5
Specifically, the American Safety court advanced four reasons to
support its judgment that antitrust claims are unsuitable for arbitra-
tion. First, and most important, the court acknowledged the effect
antitrust violations have on the public, stating that "[a] claim under
the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter."76 The private anti-
trust plaintiff serves as a "private attorney-general who protects the
public interest."77 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the public
has not consented to arbitration and that the public's interests are
not adequately represented in arbitration, which primarily concerns
the interests of the private parties. The court recognized that "anti-
trust violations can affect hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-
of people and inflict staggering economic damage."7 8 As such, these
violations are far too important to the public to allow private parties
to resolve such claims through arbitration.79 Because of the substan-
tial public interest involved, the court concluded that "[w]e do not be-
lieve that Congress intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere
than in the courts."8 0
Second, the court suggested that the possibility that contracts gen-
erating antitrust disputes may be adhesion contracts militates against
automatic forum selection by contract.8 ' Stating that arbitration
clauses may represent the attempt of a monopolist, through adhesion
contracts, to preselect the forum for trying antitrust disputes, the
court found arbitration clauses inconsistent with the policies inherent
in the antitrust laws and thus unenforceable.8 2
Third, the court maintained that the complicated nature of anti-
trust issues is more suitable for judicial than arbitral procedures.8 3
75. Id. at 827-28.
76. Id. at 826.
77. Id. at 826-27.
78. Id. at 826.
79. Id. at 826-27.
80. Id. at 827.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 827-28.
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Because antitrust claims are complicated and require sophisticated
legal and economic analysis, they are especially ill-suited to the
strengths of arbitration.84 Further, arbitration's limited discovery
process and streamlined procedures are ultimately incompatible with
complex antitrust issues.
Finally, the court stated that the antitrust laws were designed to
regulate the business community. Since arbitrators are often mem-
bers of the business community and are selected primarily for their
business expertise, it is improper "for them to determine these issues
of great public interest."8 5 The court questioned the wisdom of al-
lowing the business community to select an arbitrator to enforce poli-
cies designed to regulate the business community itself.86
The holding in American Safety was adopted by every court that
addressed the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims.87 However,
the growing acceptance of commercial arbitration in the 1970s and
1980s led the Supreme Court to narrow the scope of this doctrine.
C. The Expansion of Arbitrability: The Supreme Court's
International Transaction Distinction and 1934 Act Claims
The Supreme Court's first step in restricting the American Safety
doctrine occurred in a case involving claims under the 1934 Act. In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,88 the American company Alberto-Cul-
ver had purchased from Scherk, a German citizen, several interre-
lated business enterprises organized under the laws of Germany and
Liechtenstein, along with certain trademarks owned by these enter-
prises.8 9 The sales contract contained a clause providing for arbitra-
tion before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris of "any
controversy or claims [that] shall arise out of this agreement or
breach thereof."90 Alberto-Culver subsequently brought suit against
84. Id.
85. Id. at 827.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116
(7th Cir. 1978); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1976); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Pro-
gramming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus.,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Power Replacements,
Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
88. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
89. Id. at 508.
90. Id. The provision reads in its entirety:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agree-
ment or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter
shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbi-
tration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the International
Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator, if the parties
shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator appointed by each party and a third
arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party
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Scherk alleging that he had violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act9l
by fraudulently misrepresenting the status of the trademarks as
unencumbered.92
The Supreme Court, citing concerns of international commerce and
comity, enforced the arbitration agreement as to the 1934 Act
claims.93 Although it recognized the controversy would be nonarbi-
trable under Wilko94 had it arisen out of a domestic transaction, the
Court maintained that the international nature of the claim "involves
considerations and policies significantly different from those found
controlling in Wilko."95 The Court stated:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is... an almost indispensable pre-
condition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction .... A parochial refusal by the courts of
one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only
frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive
jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.9 6
The Court upheld the agreement to arbitrate because to do otherwise
would "surely damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter
into international commercial agreements." 97 The 1934 Act's policy
of protecting investors was outweighed by considerations of interna-
tional commerce and comity.
The Court distinguished Scherk from Wilko and American
Safety98 based on the international nature of the transaction.99 The
Court relied in part on The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,100 which
held that a forum selection clause of an international agreement
"should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
to make an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber. All arbi-
tration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party agrees to
comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and to the
entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such pro-
ceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern
this agreement, its interpretation and performance.
Id. at 508-09 n.1.
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
92. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509.
93. Id. at 519-20.
94. 346 U.S. 426 (1953).
95. Id. at 515.
96. Id. at 516-17.
97. Id. at 517.
98. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518.
100. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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aside."11 The Bremen Court, in an oft-cited quotation, stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged
if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.1 0 2
Unlike the Wilko and American Safety courts, which weighed the
policies of the Arbitration Act against the conflicting policies they
found in the relevant federal statutes, Scherk added a third factor:
international commercial considerations. This factor was sufficient to
tilt the balance in favor of arbitration.03 Under the Scherk rationale,
a domestic 1934 Act claim would be nonarbitrable because Wilko
would presumably still control. Indeed, several courts have subse-
quently held that agreements to arbitrate domestic-based 1933 and
1934 Act claims were unenforceable.10 4
In Scherk, it appeared that the Court had abandoned the public in-
terest approach and adopted an international transaction test to help
implement the federal policy favoring arbitration as enunciated in
the Arbitration Act. Having found international 1934 Act claims to
be arbitrable, the Court next addressed the arbitrability of interna-
tional antitrust claims.
D. The Arbitrability of International Antitrust Claims: Narrowing
the American Safety Doctrine
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,105 the
Supreme Court was forced to confront the clash between its public
interest and international transaction approaches. In that case, the
Court addressed whether statutory claims founded on the Sherman
and Clayton Antitrust Acts are arbitrable when they arise from an
international commercial agreement containing a broad arbitration
provision. In 1974, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (Soler), a Puerto Rican
corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mit-
subishi Motors Corporation (Mitsubishi), a Japanese corporation that
is the product of a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A.
(Chrysler), a Swiss corporation, and another Japanese corporation.
Under the agreement, Soler was to act as an agent for Chrysler in
distributing vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi. The major area of
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.
104. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 105 U.S. 1240, 1244 n.1 (1985). In Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that
Wilko, which held that claims arising under the 1933 Act could not be compelled to
arbitration, would also ban arbitration of 1934 Act claims arising in a domestic context.
473 U.S. 614, 630-31.
105. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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distribution was to be outside the continental United States. 0 6 The
agreement provided for "arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Ar-
bitration Association of all disputes arising out of ... the agreement
or for the breach thereof."' 07
In 1981, disputes between the parties arose due to declining sales.
Subsequently, Mitsubishi sought an order to compel arbitration of
the disputes under the arbitration provision and in accordance with
the Arbitration Act and the Convention on the Recognition of For-
eign Arbitral Awards.108 Soler counterclaimed that Mitsubishi's ac-
tions violated the Sherman Act, alleging that Mitsubishi and
Chrysler conspired to divide markets, thereby imposing restraints on
trade. 0 9
The district court ordered arbitration of the federal antitrust is-
sues. 110 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held
the antitrust issues to be nonarbitrable.111 The Supreme Court in
turn reversed the First Circuit and held that predispute agreements
to arbitrate all claims arising from an international contractual
agreement are enforceable with regard to federal antitrust claims.112
The Court based its holding primarily on the recognition in Scherk
of the unique concerns of international comity and commerce. It also
agreed with the reasoning in The Bremen that "agreeing in advance
on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in
international trade, commerce, and contracting."113 The Court fur-
106. Id. at 616-17.
107. Id. at 614. The arbitration provision provided:
All disputes, controversies, or differences that may arise between [Mitsubishi]
and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement
or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japanese Commercial Arbi-
tration Association.
Id. at 617.
108. See supra note 39. Shortly after filing the complaint, Mitsubishi filed a request
for arbitration before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 619.
109. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 619-20. According to Soler, Mitsubishi executed its plan
by refusing to permit Soler to resell to buyers in North, South, or Central America
vehicles it was obligated to purchase from Mitsubishi; refusing to ship ordered parts
that would be necessary to permit Soler to make its vehicles suitable for resale outside
of Puerto Rico; and coercively attempting to replace Soler and its other Puerto Rico
distributors with a wholly-owned subsidiary serving as the exclusive Mitsubishi distrib-
utor in Puerto Rico. Id. at 618, 620.
110. Id.
111. 723 F.2d 155, 166 (1st Cir. 1983).
112. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639-40.
113. Id. at 630 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1972)).
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ther noted that while "international trade has expanded in recent de-
cades, so too has the use of international arbitration to resolve
disputes."114 This expansion had led international arbitral institu-"
tions to resolve increasingly diverse and complex claims. The Court
contended that the potential for these tribunals to efficiently resolve
disputes had not yet been tested and "[i]f they are to take a central
place in the international legal order, national courts will need to
'shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,' and... cede juris-
diction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transna-
tional tribunal."115 The Court concluded that it was, therefore,
necessary that the "national courts subordinate domestic notions of
arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial
arbitration."116
Relying on its analysis in Scherk, the Court found a strong pre-
sumption in favor of freely-negotiated contractual choice of forum
provisions.1' 7 It maintained that this presumption is reinforced by
"the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" as enun-
ciated in the Arbitration Actl 8 -a policy that "applies with special
force in the field of international commerce."1 19 The Court con-
cluded that this presumption, coupled with "concerns of international
comity [and] respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals"120 and the "sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes,"121
required enforcement of the parties' agreement, notwithstanding that
a different conclusion would be reached for domestic disputes.122
The Court believed that international arbitration could sufficiently
protect the nation's interests in the enforcement of its antitrust laws.
The Court reasoned that an international tribunal, although not
bound to follow United States antitrust law, is bound to respect the
interests of the parties, and "therefore should be bound to decide that
dispute in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim[s]."123
Moreover, the United States' interest in the proper enforcement of
its antitrust laws can be protected at the award enforcement stage be-
cause the Convention grants countries the power to negate a holding
114. Id, at 638.
115. Id (citing Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d
Cir. 1942)).
116. Id at 639.
117. Id at 631.
118. Id at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
119. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631.
120. Id. at 629.
121. 1&
122. Id.
123. Id. at 636-37.
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that violates a nation's public policy.124 Such a ruling, the Court be-
lieved, would require minimal review.
Mitsubishi's holding, therefore, effectively overruled the American
Safety doctrine in the international setting. The Court, however, did
not explicitly overrule American Safety as to domestic claims. In-
stead, it distinguished the doctrine by finding "it unnecessary to as-
sess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine as applied to
agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions."125 In
dicta, the Court scrutinized the four reasons the American Safety
court had given for precluding arbitration of antitrust disputes, find-
ing three of the four to be either unjustified or unpersuasive.
First, the Court rejected the assertion that contracts which gener-
ate antitrust disputes are likely to be contracts of adhesion,126 reason-
ing that "the mere appearance of an antitrust dispute alone does not
warrant invalidation of the arbitration agreement on the undemon-
strated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted."' 27 More-
over, a party resisting arbitration can make a direct attack on the
validity of the agreement to arbitrate in a court action.128 Thus, the
Court stated "absent such a showing ... there is no basis for assum-
ing the forum inadequate or its selection unfair."' 29
Second, the Court disagreed that the potential complexity of anti-
trust disputes was a valid reason for deeming them nonarbitrable.
The Court maintained that this argument had been undermined by
124. Convention, supra note 39, art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T., at 2520. Article V(2) pro-
vides in full:
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbi-
tration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
Id.; see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14. For an analysis of the
scope of the public policy exception, see McClendon, supra note 15, at 96-99; Note,
Public Policy Exception to Arbitration of Antitrust Issues, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 430
n.25 (1984).
125. Mitsubishi, 472 U.S. at 629.
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id.
128. Id. Specifically, a party may show that the agreement was "[a]ffected by fraud,
undue influence, or overwhelming bargaining power"; or that "enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust"; or that proceedings "in the contractual forum will be so
gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all practical pur-
poses be denied of his day in court." Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Hood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
129. Id.
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court decisions that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust
claims are enforceable.1 30 Moreover, the vertical restraints which
most frequently give rise to antitrust disputes "will not generate
monstrous antitrust litigation.' 131 The Court contended that because
"adaptability and access to expertise are . . . 'the main benefits of ar-
bitration' . . . arbitral rules typically provide" expert arbitrators as
well as access to experts: Therefore, threats of complexity can be ad-
equately controlled.132 Parties also may prefer a streamlined pro-
ceeding as a means of keeping costs and efforts within reasonable
bounds.133 Thus, the Court concluded that "the factor of potential
complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could
not properly handle an antitrust matter."'134
The Court went on to reject the proposition that "decisions as to
antitrust regulation[s] . . . are too important to be lodged in arbitra-
tors chosen from the business community-particularly those from a
foreign community that has had no experience with or exposure to
our laws and values."135 Noting that international arbitrators are
commonly drawn from the legal as well as the business community,
particularly where disputes involve legal issues,136 the Court "de-
cline[d] to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain compe-
tent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators."137
Having disapproved three of the American Safety court's reasons
for holding antitrust claims nonarbitrable, the Court characterized
the fourth rationale of the American Safety doctrine as its core: "the
fundamental importance of American democratic capitalism of the
regime of the antitrust laws: and, specifically, the notion that private
parties played a pivotal role in aiding governmental enforcement of
the antitrust laws by means of the private action for treble dam-
ages."138 "The treble damages [rule is] wielded by the private litigant
[as] a chief tool in... antitrust enforcement," acting as a "crucial de-
terrent to potential violators."'139 While finding this a powerful justi-
130. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich &
Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).




135. Id. at 634 n.18.
136. Id. at 634. For support of this proposition, the Court pointed out that the arbi-
tration panel selected to hear the instant dispute consisted of a former law school
dean, a former judge, and a practicing attorney. Id. at 634 n.18.
137. Id. at 634.
138. Id. at 634-35. The dissent believed that the extraordinary importance of anti-
trust law to western democratic capitalism meant that such claims could not be arbi-
trated. Id. at 653.
139. Id. at 635.
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fication for holding antitrust claims nonarbitrable, the Court
concluded that, because the treble damages remedy is primarily re-
medial in nature, it "does not compel the conclusion that it may not
be sought outside an American court."140 Emphasizing the priority of
the compensatory function over the deterrent function of the treble
damages remedy, the Court stated that "so long as the prospective lit-
igant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the ar-
bitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function."141 Therefore, the core economic philosophy of
the American Safety doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of
the antitrust laws to democratic capitalism, was not violated through
international arbitration.
E. The Strength of the American Safety Doctrine after Mitsubishi
While the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi overruled the American
Safety doctrine only with regard to international antitrust claims,
two broad policy considerations previously adopted by the Court to
support the nonarbitrability of federal statutory claims may still be
applied to domestic antitrust claims. First, the public's interest in the
judicial enforcement of antitrust claims may be a compelling reason
to preclude the arbitration of domestic claims. Second, the inherent
differences between domestic and international commerce make in-
ternational claims more suitable for arbitration. A careful analysis
reveals, however, that while these policy considerations have some
strength, they are weakened by internal inconsistencies and out-
weighed by countervailing concerns that support extending the
Court's holding in Mitsubishi to domestic antitrust claims.
In Mitsubishi, the Court held that international antitrust claims
were suitable for arbitration. Unlike domestic antitrust disputes, the
Convention's "public policy" exception provides federal courts with
the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to protect the legiti-
mate public interests at stake in antitrust claims. A court can review
an international arbitral award under the Convention whereas, in
contrast, the Arbitration Act provides for very limited review of arbi-
tral awards for domestic claims. Accordingly, no such judicial review
of domestic claims exists to protect the public's interest in the proper
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Therefore, Mitsubishi's interna-
140. Id.
141. Id at 637.
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tional/domestic distinction arguably has some merit for domestic an-
titrust claims.
While the foregoing argument has a surface appeal, serious flaws in
the Court's international transaction distinction undermine its valid-
ity. First, the Court's distinction was based on the assumption that
international arbitral awards will, under the Convention's public pol-
icy exception, be subject to judicial review. The review afforded by
the Convention is, however, essentially illusory; present law permits
only a very narrow review of the public policy aspect of arbitral
awards.142 One federal court has held that the public policy excep-
tion can be triggered only where enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards "would violate the forum state's most basic notions of moral-
ity and justice."143 The Mitsubishi Court supported such a narrow
review: "[The] efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substan-
tive review at the award enforcement stage remain minimal."144 The
Court perceived the scope of review as an inquiry into whether the
"tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided
them."14 Because arbitration, both international and domestic, is
characterized by the lack of a record, such a limited review of inter-
national arbitral awards is essentially useless in ensuring the proper
enforcement of the antitrust laws. The scope of review of arbitral
awards afforded international claims under Mitsubishi is basically
the same as that afforded domestic arbitral awards.146
The Court in Mitsubishi asserted that "so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function."147 With the limited review afforded by the
Convention, there is no reason to think that a party to an interna-
tional dispute is more likely to vindicate its statutory cause of action
than would a disputant in a domestic arbitration. Indeed, one district
court, in the time period between Mitsubishi and McMahon,148 over-
ruled the American Safety doctrine in the domestic context precisely
because it found the Mitsubishi reasoning to be more compelling in
the domestic context.149  Specifically, the court asserted that
142. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1982).
143. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
Du Paper, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
144. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
145. Id.
146. See Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: As-
sessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. TRANSNAT'L L.J. 265, 279-80 (1987).
147. Mitsubishi 473 U.S. at 637.
148. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
149. New York City Shoe Co. v. Coray Management, Inc., No. 87-0790, slip op. (E.D.
Pa. May 7, 1987) ("despite strong public policy reasons [which] suggest a contrary re-
sult, arbitration of plaintiff's [domestic] antitrust claim is compelled by Mitsubishi").
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"[u]nlike foreign arbitrators who have had little or no experience
with or exposure to our law and values, domestic arbitrators have the
benefit of the American spirit of free competition."150 Thus, "[a] do-
mestic arbitral tribunal ingrained with American antitrust jurispru-
dence is far better suited to vindicate these statutory causes of action
than an international tribunal with its inherent ethnocentrism."151
The weakness of the international transaction distinction can also
be seen in the difficulty of developing a workable criteria for the def-
inition of "international" transactions. As one commentator has
pointed out, the distinction between domestic and international
transactions made necessary by Mitsubishi likely will give rise to liti-
gation.152 As the number of commercial transactions connected to in-
ternational trade steadily increases, this issue will grow in
significance. In fact, the international transaction distinction may
create incentives for including an "international ingredient" in a con-
tract to ensure eligibility for arbitration.
The tenuous rationale for creating an international distinction, and
the costs involved in implementing it, suggest that the distinction
should be abandoned and domestic antitrust claims held arbitrable.153
Genna v. Lady Foot Int'l, Inc., 1986-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67, at 317 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
1986).
While these two cases overrule the American Safety doctrine in the domestic con-
text, several other federal district courts have upheld it. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgar-
ten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986) (accepting the validity of
the American Safety doctrine to domestic claims following Mitsubishi); Stendig Int'l,
Inc. v. B & B Italia, 633 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (antitrust claims remain nonarbi-
trable following Mitsubishi); Smith v. Payfone Systems, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 121 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (concluding that domestic antitrust claims remain nonarbitrable following
Mitsubishi).
150. Genna, 1986-3 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 61.
151. Id.
152. Comment, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims under US., German, and EEC
Law: The "International Transaction". Criterion and Public Policy, 22 TEx. INT'L.
L.J. 291, 318 (1987). Furthermore, in drafting the private treble damage provision of
the antitrust laws, Congress drew no distinction between domestic antitrust claims and
those that would arise in connection with international transactions. If an interna-
tional transaction involving an unreasonable restraint of trade has sufficient effect on
United States commerce to come within the federal antitrust laws, private antitrust
suits attacking that restraint will serve the same public interest functions as a similar
suit in a domestic context. Moreover, the strengths of arbitration recognized in Mit-
subishi-namely efficiency, speed, arbitrator expertise, and flexibility--are equally ap-
plicable to domestic claims.
153. Id. at 318. Moreover, some federal courts have recognized that antitrust claims
arising in contractual disputes are often frivolous. See, e.g., Reisner v. General Motors
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). Therefore, parties to a dispute also have an incentive to
assert antitrust claims, even on weak grounds, in an attempt to provide federal court
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Indeed, the Court in McMahon 154 recognized the foregoing problems
with the international transaction distinction and abandoned it alto-
gether, declaring all RICO claims to be arbitrable, domestic as well as
international.155
The second broad policy consideration cited in support of the
American Safety doctrine is the public's interest in the proper en-
forcement of the antitrust laws, which requires that domestic anti-
trust disputes be settled in a judicial forum. The antitrust laws are
not designed to protect either of the contracting parties from over-
reaching by the other, but to promote competition in the economic
system. Commentators have argued that arbitration is unfit to pro-
mote such a purpose because it is primarily private in nature,
designed only to reach an equitable solution between the two parties.
Arbitration does not take into account the effect that the antitrust
laws have on third parties,156 as an arbitrator will not "sacrifice the
most equitable resolution . . . between the parties [for] . .. the eco-
nomic needs of society as expressed in the antitrust laws."157
Recognition of the importance of the public's interest in the proper
enforcement of the antitrust laws can be found by examining the
texts of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, other statutes, and the
courts' treatment of the antitrust laws in general. Several unusual
features of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, most notably that "an an-
titrust treble damage case can only be brought in a District Court of
the United States,"15 8 support the conclusion that "these cases are
'too important to be decided otherwise than by competent tribunals'
[and] surely [we] cannot allow private arbitrators to assume a juris-
diction that is denied to courts of the sovereign States."159 The ex-
jurisdiction and remove the dispute to a forum perceived by the antitrust claimant as
more favorable to case.
154. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
155. See inkfra notes 169-202 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court stated that
while Scherk "was limited to international agreements, the competence of arbitral
tribunals to resolve § 10(b) claims is the same in both [domestic and international] set-
tings." McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2340.
156. One commentator warns that if the ADR movement expands dramatically, the
resulting adverse effect upon third parties must be taken into account. In the worst
case scenario, widespread ADR, independent of substantive law, could actually in-
crease the number of disputes because third parties could lose the incentive to perform
in accordance with legal norms. Once a party loses predictability, the benefit of law as
a signal is lost. Brunet, supra note 19, at 19.
157. Sterk, supra note 21, at 503-04. Moreover, the lack of a written public record
explaining the reasoning of the decision makes arbitration incompatible with society's
and the business community's needs for behavioral guidelines regarding competitive
behavior.
158. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 654
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920)).
159. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting University Life
Ins. Co. v. Unimarc, Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983)). Justice Stevens also noted that:
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traordinary public importance of the antitrust laws is emphasized in
other statutes enacted by Congress. For instance, in 1913, Congress
passed a special act guaranteeing public access to depositions in gov-
ernmental civil proceedings to enforce the Sherman Act.160
The conventional wisdom in antitrust cases is that the antitrust
laws function as a principal bulwark of western democratic capital-
ism. Several courts have even analogized the antitrust laws to the
Bill of Rights with regard to their importance to our society. Indeed,
Justice Marshall characterized the Sherman Act as the "'character
of freedom' that may be compared to a constitutional provision" and
as "the Magna Carta of free enterprise."161 Moreover, the survival of
the American Safety doctrine at a time when judicial acceptance of
arbitration of federal statutory claims has reached a peak signifies
the courts' recognition of the importance of the antitrust laws.
Despite the apparent validity of the public interest rationale in pre-
cluding the arbitration of domestic antitrust disputes, several argu-
ments undermine it, and thus support the arbitrability of such claims.
The unique public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws is repeat-
edly reflected in the special remedial scheme enacted by Congress. Since its
enactment in 1890, the Sherman Act has provided for public enforcement
through criminal as well as civil sanctions.... Section 7... uses the broadest
possible language to describe the class of litigants who may invoke its protec-
tion .... The provision for mandatory treble damages-unique in federal law
when the statute was enacted-provides a special incentive to the private en-
forcement of the statute, as well as an especially powerful deterrent to
violators.
Id. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1913).
161. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1971). Justice Marshall
characterized the antitrust laws as:
(T]he Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preserva-
tion of economic freedom as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fun-
damental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed
with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens ...
believe that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more
important sector of the economy.
Id. at 610. Justice Black has commented that:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.
Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
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First, the public interest argument is weakened by the fact that all
courts allow the private settlement antitrust claims.162 Thus, the
courts recognize that "Congress has indicated that antitrust consider-
ations may be subordinated to a just resolution of the dispute be-
tween the parties."163  Significantly, Congress has not required
judicial approval of settlements, as it has in other contexts where the
public interest is thought to be at stake, such as class actions. 6 4 Set-
tlement of antitrust claims fails to protect the public's interest in the
antitrust laws because it is wholly private in nature and does not take
into account the third party interests involved in the antitrust laws.
Because arbitration itself is a form of private settlement, allowing
formal settlement of antitrust disputes is inconsistent with preclud-
ing arbitration.165
Equally inconsistent is the universally accepted doctrine that a
post-dispute agreement to arbitrate both domestic and international
antitrust disputes is enforceable. 6 6 Courts have uniformly permitted
arbitration in these situations because it promotes settlement.167
Furthermore, "the right of disputants to pursue an agreed settlement
is a deeply embedded attribute of the freedom of contract."' 68 The
strengths and weaknesses of arbitration are the same regardless of
whether the antitrust claims already were asserted when the agree-
ment to arbitrate was made; the same public interest may be frus-
162. For instance, during the period between 1964-1969, over 3000 private antitrust
cases were dismissed by agreement of the parties while only 554 continued to judg-
ment. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON. 365, 382-
83 (1970).
163. Sterk, supra note 21, at 508.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
165. Perhaps if Congress were really concerned with the public interest in antitrust
litigation, we would require all claims to be litigated and ban the private settlement of
such claims. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
166. See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich &
Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972). The Coenen court stated
that:
The courts give as reasons for this that the parties already know just what
they are agreeing to arbitrate, and also that, as a claimant is not required to
sue and is always free to settle a private triple-damage antitrust case, his
agreement to arbitrate is in effect an agreement to settle the dispute. So here
the agreement to arbitrate may be regarded as an agreement to arbitrate spe-
cific existing dispute.
453 F.2d at 1215. See generally Allison, supra note 18, at 260-62.
167. Sterk, supra note 21, at 507-08. Sterk asserts that permitting arbitration after
a dispute arises is logically consistent, because parties will look at arbitration with the
prospects of success in litigation in mind and will choose arbitration only if litigation is
likely to be unsuccessful. As long as the parties are well-informed and rational, an
agreement to arbitrate is likely unless it is also probable that the arbitration award
will be the rough equivalent of the court result. Sterk concluded that permitting the
arbitration of existing disputes is unlikely to frustrate antitrust policy. Id. at 511. This
argument, however, fails to address the public policy concerns of using antitrust prece-
dent to guide future behavior.
168. Allison, supra note 18, at 259-60.
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trated in arbitrating existing and future disputes. All four original
rationales behind the American Safety doctrine-concerns of com-
plexity, contracts of adhesion, public interest, and the regulation of
the business community-are inconsistent with enforcing post-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims.
The importance of the public interest in the proper enforcement of
the antitrust laws, coupled with the Court's international transaction
distinction in Mitsubishi, argue for preserving the American Safety
doctrine in the domestic context. However, the counterarguments-
namely, the inconsistencies of permitting settlement of antitrust dis-
putes, enforcing post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, and the arbi-
trariness of the international transaction distinction-severely
weaken the case for continuing to apply the American Safety doc-
trine to domestic claims. Additionally, the Supreme Court's latest
case involving commercial arbitration, while not directly addressing
the American Safety doctrine or the antitrust laws, has by analogy
foreshadowed the death of the doctrine.
IV. ATTACK BY ANALOGY: THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
AMERICAN SAFETY DOCTRINE
A. The Arbitrability of Claims Brought Under the RICO Act and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
In the Supreme Court's most recent case on commercial arbitra-
tion, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,169 the Court ex-
amined the arbitrability of claims arising under the 1934 Actl7o and
RICO.171 The plaintiffs, Eugene and Julia McMahon, were custom-
ers of the defendant, a brokerage firm. "Two customer agreements
signed by Julia McMahon provided for arbitration of any controversy
relating to the accounts the McMahons maintained with Shear-
son."172 In October 1984, the McMahons filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
169. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
172. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2335. The arbitration clause stated:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out
of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agree-
ment or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
Id. at 2335-36.
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alleging that the defendant violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
rule 10b-5173 by engaging in fraudulent, excessive trading on their ac-
counts and by making false statements and omitting material facts
from the advice given to them. Furthermore, the complaint alleged a
RICO violation,174 and included state law claims for fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty.
The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the applicable
provision in the customer agreements and pursuant to section 3 of
the Arbitration Act.175 The district court granted the defendants'
motion as to the 1934 Act claims and the state law claims.176 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, joining the
majority of circuits which have addressed the issue, affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding on the state law and RICO claims, but reversed
on the 1934 Act claims.177 The Supreme Court then granted certio-
rari' 7 8 to resolve the split amongst the circuits regarding the arbi-
trability of section 10(b) claims179 and RICO claims. 8 0
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
175. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 mandates that a court must stay its proceedings
if it is satisfied that an issue before it is arbitrable under a specific agreement. Id.
176. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332
(1987). Analogizing the RICO Act to the antitrust laws, the court found that the RICO
claim was nonarbitrable "because of the important federal policies inherent in the en-
forcement of RICO by the federal courts." Id. at 387.
177. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). In upholding the district court, the court of appeals found
that public policy considerations made it inappropriate to apply the provisions of the
Arbitration Act to RICO suits. The court reasoned that RICO claims, like antitrust
claims, are "not merely a private matter" because a RICO plaintiff can be "likened to a
private attorney general" protecting the public interest. Thus, such claims must be re-
solved in a judicial forum. Id. The disputes in McMahon arose from a domestic agree-
ment.
In reversing the district court with regard to the section 10(b) claims, the court of
appeals relied upon the reasoning in Wilko that claims under section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 were nonarbitrable. Id. at 97-98. While recognizing that Scherk
and Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), have cast doubt on Wilko's ap-
plicability to section 10(b) claims, the second circuit was bound by its previous deci-
sions which extended Wilko to claims under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. McMahon,
788 F.2d at 97-98; see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
178. 479 U.S. 812 (1986).
179. Compare Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1987);
Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986); Jacobson v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986); King v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986); Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032
(11th Cir. 1986); with Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d
1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
180. Compare McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986);
Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986); with
Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986).
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that the pur-
pose of the Arbitration Act was to establish "a federal policy favoring
arbitration,"S1 mandating the "enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims." 8 2 While the Court recognized this mandate
could be overridden by a "contrary congressional command," the
Court placed the burden on the party opposing arbitration "to show
that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue."1s 3 Specifically, to overcome the pre-
sumption of arbitrability, the moving party must "demonstrate that
Congress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for
claims arising under RICO and the Exchange Act, an intention dis-
cernible from the text, history, or purposes of the statute."' 8 4
The Court could not find in the 1934 Act the requisite congres-
sional intent to overcome the presumption of arbitrability. 8 5 The
Court rejected the McMahons' argument that section 29(a), which
voids the waiver of any provision of the Act,186 forbids waiver of sec-
tion 27, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts of all
actions arising from the 1934 Act.187 The Court maintained that an
arbitration agreement merely waives the procedural component of
the 1934 Act, giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over these
claims, and that section 29 does not cover such a procedural
waiver. 88
In reaching its holding, the Court reinterpreted Wilko under
Scherk "as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration
is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue." 8 9 The Court
181. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)). The Court in Cone stated:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbi-
tration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract lan-
guage itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
182. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2338.
185. Id.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
187. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338. Section 27 states, in pertinent part: "The district
courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter of the rules and
regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
188. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
189. Id at 2339.
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found that arbitration had developed and matured since the 1950s:
"It is difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process
with this Court's subsequent decisions [including both Mitsubishi and
Scherk] involving the Arbitration Act."190 Wilko's assumptions re-
garding arbitration "do not hold true today for arbitration procedures
subject to the SEC's oversight authorityl 91 and the new strict proce-
dural guidelines, established by the American Arbitration
Association." 192
The arbitrability of RICO claims was a much easier issue for the
Court to analyze because it found that RICO's text and legislative
history fail to reveal any intent to override the provisions of the Ar-
bitration Act.193 Therefore, the plaintiffs must prove "an irreconcila-
ble conflict between arbitration and RICO's underlying purposes."194
The plaintiffs here were unable to do so. Furthermore, RICO, unlike
the 1934 Act, contains no antiwaiver provision and its jurisdictional
provision does not specify that federal courts will have exclusive ju-
risdiction. Without this obstacle to arbitrability, the Court had little
problem reaching the conclusion that RICO claims are arbitrable.195
In rejecting the argument that RICO claims are too complex or too
complicated by their criminal component to be arbitrable, the Court
adopted the reasoning of Mitsubishi.196 The Court contended that
"potential complexity should not suffice to ward off arbitration"197
because "antitrust matters are every bit as complex as RICO claims,
but ... the adaptability and access to expertise characteristic of arbi-
tration rebutted the view that an arbitral tribunal could not properly
handle an antitrust matter."198
The Court also used Mitsubishi to reject the argument that the
public interest in enforcing RICO precludes submission of such
claims to arbitration.199 After examining RICO's legislative history,
190. Id. at 2340-41.
191. Id. at 2341. The Court also rejected the McMahon's argument that Wilko
barred enforcement of predispute agreements because arbitration clauses in securities
sales are not freely negotiated and frequently tend to result from broker overreaching.
Id. at 2339. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that even if section 29(a) as en-
acted does not void arbitration agreements, Congress subsequently has amended the
1934 Act to do so. Id. at 2342.
192. See AAA Releases New Arbitration Rules, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1392
(Sept. 18, 1987).
193. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2344.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2345-46.
196. Id. at 2344.
197. Id.
198. Id. With regard to RICO's criminal provisions and arbitrability, the Court, re-
lying upon Mitsubishi's analysis of the antitrust act's criminal provisions, stated: "We
similarly find that the criminal provisions of RICO do not preclude arbitration of bona
fide civil actions brought under § 1964(c)." Id.
199. Id. at 2345.
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the Court adopted Mitsubishi's analysis of the remedial function of
the treble damage remedy of the antitrust laws. The Court consid-
ered this analysis equally applicable to RICO claims and asserted that
"so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statu-
tory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function." 200 Finding that "the
private attorney general role for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply
less plausible than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff," the Court
concluded that "there is even more reason to suppose that arbitration
will adequately serve the purposes of RICO than that it will ade-
quately protect private enforcement of the antitrust laws."20 Ac-
cordingly, the Court found that the McMahons, "having made the
bargain to arbitrate, will be held to their bargain."202
B. The RICO-Antitrust Analogy: The Arbitration of Federal
Domestic Antitrust Caims
After McMahon, few federal statutory claims are not subject to ar-
bitration. A court interpreting a standard arbitration clause will find
its scope broad enough to cover almost all commercial claims.203
However, a plaintiff bringing a domestic transaction claim under the
federal antitrust laws will face the American Safety doctrine, which
still is accepted by courts after Mitsubishi and McMahon.204 Despite
continuing acceptance of the doctrine, it appears that while Mitsub-
ishi limited the doctrine to the domestic context, the Court's holding
in McMahon signalled its impending death. The text of RICO, its leg-
islative history, and Court commentary on the statute clearly demon-
strate that RICO's remedial provisions were patterned directly after
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2346.
202. Id.
203. After McMahon, 1933 Act claims remained nonarbitrable under Wilko. It is
apparent, however, that the McMahon holding severely weakened the Wilko court's
analysis; at least one federal court has expressly overruled Wilko and allowed arbitra-
tion of 1933 Act claims. See Staiman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
Other claims which are presently nonarbitrable include: Title VII claims, Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); FSLA claims, Barentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1975); tort claims (though several state legislatures have
enacted statutes providing for arbitration of medical malpractice claims); and federal
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)), McDonald v. West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984).
204. All federal courts, but one, that have addressed the viability of the American
Safety doctrine after Mitsubishi and McMahon still find it controlling. See supra note
149.
S231
the antitrust acts. With this recognition, the Court's holding in Mc-
Mahon that domestic and international RICO claims are arbitrable
leads to the conclusion, by analogy, that domestic antitrust claims
similarly must be arbitrable. Moreover, the fact that Congress has
recently enacted legislation permitting the arbitration of patent law
claims supports the conclusion that domestic antitrust claims are
arbitrable.205
The text of RICO demonstrates that it was patterned directly after
the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Acts. The language permitting
"any person injured in his business and property" to sue in a federal
district court for treble damages and attorney's fees was taken verba-
tim from the Clayton Act.20 Moreover, RICO and the antitrust laws
are virtually identical in their remedial provisions. Section 4 of the
Clayton Act states that a civil plaintiff "shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including reasonable
attorney's fee";207 section 1964(c) of RICO provides that a civil RICO
plaintiff "shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit including reasonable attorney's fee."208 The close re-
lationship between the remedies for RICO violations and for anti-
trust violations is not coincidental; the Justice Department, for
example, had previously used the antitrust laws to combat union
racketeering.209
The legislative history of RICO further demonstrates the similarity
in remedial approach. When RICO was in its formative stages before
the House, both the Department of Justice and the American Bar
Association proposed an amendment "authorizing private damage
suits based upon the concept of section 4 of the Clayton Act."210 Sim-
ilarly, Representative Poff noted that the provision "has its counter-
part almost in haec verba in the antitrust statutes."211 Moreover,
section 4 of the Clayton Act was "recurrently invoked during the
congressional discussion of RICO's private treble damages
provision." 212
The Supreme Court itself has expressly recognized that the treble
205. See supra note 12.
206. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (RICO) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (Clayton
Act).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
209. Only 11 criminal antitrust cases resulted in jail sentences for businessmen be-
tween 1890 and 1940. Ten of those cases involved overt acts of racketeering such as
threats, intimidation and violence. A number of antitrust violations in the 1950s and
1960s involved what can be viewed as racketeering activity. See Hartwell, Criminal
RICO and Antitrust, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 312 (1983).
210. Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1970).
211. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 295 (1970).
212. Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 165 (1986).
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damages remedy of RICO was patterned directly after section 4 of
the Clayton Act. The Court has observed that "[t]he clearest current
in [RICO's] history is the reliance on the Clayton Act model, under
which private and governmental actions are entirely distinct."213
Furthermore, the Court recognized that the RICO treble damage
provision "tracks virtually word for word the treble damage provi-
sion of the antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act; given this parallel,
there can be little doubt that the latter served as a model for the for-
mer."2 14 The Court has quoted RICO's sponsor: "Despite the will-
ingness of the courts to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to
organized crime activities, as a practical matter the legitimate busi-
nessman does not have adequate civil remedies available under that
act. This bill fills that gap."21 5
The text, legislative history, and Supreme Court commentary sup-
port the antitrust/RICO analogy. By holding RICO claims arbitrable,
the McMahon Court sent an implied signal that antitrust claims must
similarly be arbitrable. Moreover, the American Safety doctrine fails
to survive the McMahon analytical framework for the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims. Under McMahon, the party moving to pre-
vent arbitration must demonstrate that Congress intended to make
an exception to the Arbitration Act for the claims, and the intent
must be discernible from the text, history, or purpose of the stat-
213. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
214. Id. at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior to McMahon, several courts analo-
gized the antitrust statutes and RICO to find the latter nonarbitrable under the ration-
ale of the American Safety doctrine. See, e.g., Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986); S.A. Mineracao Da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Now that the
Supreme Court has overruled these courts and found RICO claims arbitrable, the
courts' analogy leads to the opposite conclusion--antitrust claims must be arbitrable
because RICO claims are arbitrable.
215. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 516 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Further-
more, the prosecution of RICO and antitrust claims overlap. RICO's civil provisions
have been used in cases involving allegations of horizontal and vertical price fixing, at-
tempted monopolization, anticompetitive mergers, collusion over municipal contracts,
industrial espionage, and Robinson-Patman violations. See Nathan, Doubling the
Treble Damage Option: What an Antitrust Practitioner Needs to Know about RICO, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1983). Indeed, Congress intended RICO's civil provisions to allow
private parties to use machinery based on the anbtitrust model to supplement the fed-
eral government's criminal enforcement of RICO. Moreover, one commentator has
contended that RICO and the antitrust laws are both concerned with creating a fair,
efficient economy. Congress designed RICO to eliminate the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate business organizations, unions, and government. See Blakey &
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
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ute.2 1 6 Just as the McMahon Court failed to find such intent behind
RICO, there is no evidence of a congressional intent to preclude the
arbitration of antitrust claims. Therefore, a party must prove an ir-
reconcilable conflict between arbitration and antitrust. The irrecon-
cilable conflict on which the American Safety doctrine is based,
namely the public's interest in the proper enforcement of the anti-
trust laws, was rejected as a reason to preclude arbitration by the
Court in both Mitsubishi and McMahon. Therefore, the American
Safety doctrine fails to survive the McMahon analysis; domestic anti-
trust claims, under the mandate of the Arbitration Act, must be
arbitrable.
C The Arbitrability of "Monopoly Issues ": The Arbitration of
Patent Claims
Consistent with the Court's ruling on RICO claims, Congress's re-
cent mandate that patent law claims are arbitrable supports the arbi-
trability of domestic antitrust claims.2' 7 The patent laws are
substantively similar in that a patent, in effect, is the granting of a
monopoly. Prior to 1982, claims under the patent laws were held
nonarbitrable because of the public interest in patent enforcement.
In 1982 and 1984, Congress adopted legislation making patent valid-
ity, infringement, and interference arbitrable.218
In allowing arbitration of "monopoly issues" with regard to patent
claims, Congress demonstrated its growing acceptance of arbitration
for important statutory claims. Public interest concerns were out-
weighed by Congress's recognition of the benefits of commercial arbi-
tration. The Court should follow Congress's lead by rejecting the
same public interest concern behind the American Safety doctrine.
Allowing the arbitrability of patent claims involving "monopoly is-
sues" supports the rejection of the American Safety doctrine.
The analogy between RICO and the antitrust acts indicates that,
after McMahon, domestic antitrust claims should be arbitrable. Due
to the clear similarity between the remedial provisions of RICO and
the antitrust acts, the McMahon rationale applies equally well to do-
mestic antitrust claims. Moreover, the Court in McMahon rejected
the international transaction distinction holding that all RICO claims
are arbitrable. Both the Court in McMahon, and Congress through
216. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
217. Carmichael, The Arbitration of Patent Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1983, at 3; Mc-
Clendon, supra note 15, at 96.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982); 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (Supp. IV 1986). The legislative his-
tory asserts that arbitration of patent disputes would serve the public interest by en-
couraging innovation and relieving some of the burdens on the overworked federal
courts. See Tupman, Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes Under U.S. Law,
ARB. J., Dec. 1987, at 3, 4.
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the patent laws, have rejected the public policy rationale at the heart
of the American Safety doctrine by finding that arbitration can effec-
tively protect the public interest. Thus, it is logically inconsistent
under McMahon to allow the arbitration of domestic RICO claims
but not domestic antitrust claims. This reasoning, coupled with the
Court's holding in Mitsubishi that international antitrust claims are
arbitrable, signals that the time has come for the American Safety
doctrine to take "its proper place among the graveyard of ideas."2 19
V. CONCLUSION
Today's litigious society demands that our court system recognize
the viability of alternative dispute resolution techniques. Congress
recognized this need and instituted, in the Arbitration Act, a national
policy favoring the arbitration of commercial claims. The Arbitration
Act was designed to overcome anachronistic judicial hostility towards
agreements to arbitrate. Arbitration subsequently has proven to be a
viable alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes. Because it is
more efficient, less costly, and non-adversarial, commercial parties
frequently include arbitration provisions in their agreements.
As the use of commercial arbitration provisions has grown, courts
have been required to determine the arbitrability of federal statutes
involving policies that conflict with the arbitral process. Although
the Arbitration Act recognized that the benefits of arbitration out-
weigh its inherent weaknesses, the courts have had difficulty recon-
ciling arbitration with the traditional fears of alternative dispute
resolution techniques. Until recently, courts clung to archaic fears,
and in doing so, adopted two suspect lines of reasoning to find federal
statutory claims nonarbitrable. First, courts found that certain fed-
eral statutory claims, such as those under the 1933 Act and antitrust
laws, were nonarbitrable due to the public's interest in proper en-
forcement. Later, the courts abandoned this public policy rationale
and adopted an international transaction test to find international
1934 Act and antitrust claims to be arbitrable.
Presently, the only remaining vestige of the anachronistic judicial
hostility to arbitration is the application of the American Safety doc-
trine to domestic antitrust claims. The public policy distinction and
international transaction test have been discredited due to their in-
ternal inconsistencies and the existence of persuasive countervailing
219. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2347 n.2 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
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concerns. Moreover, the Supreme Court now has implicitly recog-
nized the weakness of these distinctions and found that both interna-
tional and domestic RICO claims are arbitrable. Furthermore,
Congress has recently enacted legislation permitting patent claims to
be arbitrable.
These developments signal that the Court should now repudiate its
remaining outdated fears, reject the American Safety doctrine, and
accept arbitration of all commercial claims. By doing so, the Court
can be faithful to the policy of the Arbitration Act favoring arbitra-
tion and, at the same time, signal potential commercial disputants
that arbitration is a viable form of alternative dispute resolution
within the federal court system. The Court will create, therefore,
further incentives for the judicial system to develop and experiment
with other forms of dispute resolution such as the mini-trial, media-
tion, and the summary jury trial. With no end to the litigation crisis
in sight, such a development is surely welcome.
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